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What is a Property-Related Fee? An
Interpretation of California's Proposition 218
by
JOHN S. THROCKMORTON*
In 1978, the voters of California launched a full-scale assault on the
power of local governments to levy taxes on property. In that year, vot-
ers passed the revolutionary initiative known as Proposition 13 and incor-
porated into the California Constitution the principle that the power to tax
property should be subject to voter approval. Article XM A of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, as Proposition 13 later became known, was only the
beginning of a long term revolt within the state and throughout the nation
to control the size of government and protect the taxpayers' pocketbooks.
With the passage of Proposition 62 in 1982 and Proposition 218 in 1996,
both of which sought to eliminate "loopholes" left open by Proposition
13, California voters continued a trend that aims to bring local govern-
ment taxing power under the control of voters.
Unfortunately, the initiative process can be a clumsy tool. The tax
revolution in California has led to the passage of ambiguous laws that
have been difficult to execute. Legislators and judges, faced with the im-
plementation and interpretation of the new constitutional provisions, have
had to wrestle with the meaning behind the broad language of the refer-
endums. The recently passed Proposition 218 is no exception. The ini-
tiative limits local governments' authority to levy "property-related fees"
but fails to adequately define this newly created category of levies. The
drafters have placed the burden on the courts and Legislature to define
the term.
This Note attempts to provide guidance to define the terms of Propo-
sition 218. It views Proposition 218 as a continuation of the taxpayer re-
volt begun almost two decades ago. Part I looks at the initiative process
and the relative success of efforts to limit local government taxation on
property through the passage of Propositions 13, 62 and 218. Part II ex-
amines Proposition 13 more closely and specifically looks at how courts
have interpreted the ambiguous terms of that referendum. Finally, Part
* J.D. 1997, Hastings College of the Law; M.A. 1994, Syracuse University; B.A. 1992 Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles.
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m applies the principles of statutory interpretation used in Proposition 13
jurisprudence to illuminate the meaning of Proposition 218.
I. History of the California Tax Initiatives
In the middle of the 1970s, California property owners felt increas-
ing economic pressure resulting from higher property taxes levied by lo-
cal governments.' This was a result not only of increased property val-
ues2 but also uicker reassessments of properties to reflect this increase in
paper wealth. This led to homeowners paying increased taxes based on
an unrealized gain.4 At the same time, the legislature failed to pass any
form of tax relief, and the state budget surplus grew to "unprecedented
amounts." 5 Property owners were thus forced to spend an increasing
amount of their real income on taxes at a time when tax revenues ex-
ceeded the needs of state and local governments.
The proponents of Proposition 13 stated that relief was needed to
save millions of homes from foreclosure because of an inability to pay
property taxes.6 Of particular concern was the threat of senior citizens on
fixed incomes being forced to sell their homes7 or of first-time homebuy-
ers being unable to assess their ability to purchase property for their
families because of the unpredictability of tax levies.' At a time when
California state and local government taxes had risen to 15.4% of state
personal income, there was a pervasive sense that government spending
had spun out of control.9 According to a field poll conducted in 1978,
"30% [of Californians] volunteered high taxes as one of the most press-
ing issues in the state or community."10
1. PROPOSITION 13: A TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 2 (Frederick D. Stocker ed., 1991)
(hereinafter TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE).
2. See id. at 1-2 (citing growth in average household income, increased land use legisla-
tion and population growth as factors in increasing the average price of a Southern California
house from $1,100 below the national average in 1973 to $26,000 above the national average in
1978).
3. See id. at l.
4. See id. at 9.
5. See id. at2.
6. JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE, PROPOSITION 13, TEN YEARS LATER: A
REPORT ON THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE BUDGET COMMITTEE'S HEARING OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1987
10-11 (1987) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT].
7. See id. at 10.
8. See id. at 11.
9. See id. at 39 (statement of Prof. William Craig Stubblebine). Even though the overall
tax rate increased dramatically, from approximately 11.3% of state personal income in the
1960s to 15.4% in 1978, the amount of this increase attributable to property taxes was minor in
comparison to other state and local taxes. In spite of this, property taxes were the focus of tax
reform. Id.
10. See id. at3.
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Faced with a non-responsive state legislature and an unsympathetic
governor," property owners turned to the state's voter initiative process
to effect change in the state's tax structure. In 1977, Howard Jarvis and
Paul Gann circulated the "People's Petition to Control Taxation," an ini-
tiative to amend the state Constitution that easily qualified as a proposi-
tion on the ballot in June, 1978.12 This petition appeared on the ballot as
Proposition 13 and was approved by 65% of the voters.1 3 When added to
the California Constitution as Article XIII A, Proposition 1314 set into
11. See TEN YEAR RurRospEcTIVE, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that then-Governor Jerry
Brown saw property tax reform merely as a means of income redistribution).
12. See TEN YEAR R'rRosPEcTVE, supra note 1, at 2-3. Petitions proposing a constitu-
tional amendment by initiative must be signed by a number of voters equal to 8% of the number
of votes cast in the last governor's election. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. ELEC. CODE §
3524 (West 1997).
13. See JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
14. The text of Proposition 13 is as follows:
That Article XIII A is added to the Constitution to read:
Section 1.
(a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one
percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property. The one percent (1%) tax to be
collected by the counties and apportioned according to law to the districts within the
counties.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem taxes
or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on any indebtedness
approved by the voters prior to the time this section becomes effective.
Section 2.
(a) The full cash value means the County Assessor's valuation of real property as
shown on the 1975-76 tax bill under "full cash value," or thereafter, the appraised
value of real property when purchased, newly constructed or a change in ownership
has occurred after the 1975 assessment. All real property not already assessed up to
the 1975-76 tax levels may be reassessed to reflect that valuation.
(b) The fair market value base may reflect from year to year the inflationary rate not
to exceed two percent (2%) for any given year or reduction as shown in the consumer
price index or comparable data for the area under taxing jurisdiction.
Section 3.
From and after the effective date of this article, any changes in State taxes enacted for
the purpose of increasing revenues collected pursuant thereto whether [sic] by in-
creased rates or changes in methods of computations must be imposed by an Act
passed by not less than two-thirds of all members elected to each of the two houses of
the Legislature, except that no new ad valorem taxes on real property, or sales or
transactions taxes on the sales of real property may be imposed.
Section 4.
Cities, Counties and special districts by a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors of
such district, may impose special taxes on such district except ad valorem taxes on
real property or a transaction tax on the sale of real property within such City, County
or special district.
Section 5.
This article shall take effect for the tax year beginning on July 1 following the passage




place numerous limits on local governments' power to levy property
taxes,"5 including: (1) limiting real property taxes to one percent of full
cash value except as necessary to pay for previously incurred voter-
approved debt;16 (2) requiring property to be valued as of March 1, 1975
or at the date of change of ownership or construction if such date is after
March 1, 1975;17 (3) limiting subsequent annual inflation adjustments to
two percent per annum;'8 (4) prohibiting state and local governments
from imposing any sales or transaction taxes on the sale of real prop-
erty;'9 and (5) requiring a two-thirds vote in each house of the Legislature
to increase or impose new state taxes and a two-thirds vote of the "quali-
fied electors" to increase or add new local special-purpose taxes. 20
The passage of Proposition 13 represented the first of many victories
in California for advocates of limitations on local government taxing
powers. One year later, in 1979, California voters passed Proposition 4
by 74% of the vote.21 Proposition 4 turned the voters' focus away from
the revenue-raising aspect of state and local tax structures, and instead
addressed the spending aspect of the taxation power of local government
by imposing spending caps "for [virtually] every unit of California state
and local government."' The referendum limited appropriations by state
and local governments from taxes and state subventions to local govern-
ments to that entity's appropriations limit from the prior year, adjusted
for shifts in population and inflation.' Proposition 4 specifically ex-
empted appropriations for new state-mandated programs or higher levels
of service from this limitation.24 Proposition 4 was seen by many as a
sequel to Proposition 13.' These initiatives were the "culmination of a
taxpayer revolt," the central theme of which was that "elected represen-
Section 6.
If any section, part, clause or phrase hereof is for any reason held to be invalid or un-
constitutional, the remaining sections shall not be affected but will remain in full force
and effect.
TEN YEAR RETROsPECTIVE, supra note 1, app. B at 200-01 (emphasis omitted).
15. See generally TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 3; app. B (CAL. CONST.
art. XI A).
16. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 1.
17. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 2.
18. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, § 2(b).
19. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A, §§ 3-4.
20. Id.
21. See JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
22. Id. at 39 (statement of Prof. Stubblebine).
23. See TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 3. See also CAL. CONST. art. XIII
B.
24. See TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 3.
25. See JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 39 (statement of Prof. Stubblebine).
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tatives were approving more spending and more taxes than the body poli-
tic was prepared to tolerate."'
Proposition 13 had a tremendous effect on the subsequent tax reve-
nues in California. Between 1977 and 1986, the percentage distribution
of revenue attributable to property taxes declined by 38.2% for California
cities and 28.1% for California counties.27 In response to the decrease in
income from property taxes, local governments shifted their revenue
sources, primarily to other taxes and fees not subject to the super-
majority voter requirements of Proposition 13 .' During the ten years
following the passage of Proposition 13, the percentage distribution of
revenues attributable to other taxes rose 62.4% for California cities,
while that portion attributable to fees increased by 36.2% .29 In California
counties during the same time period, the shift was less stark, with a
7.6% increase in fees and a decline in the percentage change of other
taxes of 6.3% °
Existing special districts experienced a marked shift in their revenue
structures from dependence on property taxes to other sources of reve-
nue." In addition, after 1978, the state legislature expanded the scope of
services that a benefit assessment district could provide.32 California
26. Id.
27. See TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 17-18. In fiscal year 1977-78, prop-
erty taxes represented 21.7% of revenues in cities and 33.1% of revenues in counties, while in
fiscal year 1985-86, they represented 13.4% and 23.8%, respectively. Id.
28. See generally id. at 15-20 (describing the shift in revenue-raising from property taxes
to other taxes and fees); see also Julie K. Koyama, Financing Local Government in the Post-
Proposition 13 Era: The Use and Effectiveness of Nontaxing Revenue Sources, 22 PAc. L. I.
1333, 1334 (1991) ("Increasingly, municipalities have responded to the harsh fiscal effect
caused by the taxing restrictions of Proposition 13 by turning to nontaxing revenue sources not
subject to the provisions of the amendment").
29. See TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIE, supra note 1, at 17. In fiscal year 1977-78, "other
taxes" represented 10.1% of California city revenues, while in 1985-86 they represented
16.4%. In fiscal year 1977-78, fees represented 15.2% of California city revenues, while in
1985-86 they represented 20.7%. Id.
30. Id. at 18. In fiscal year 1977-78, "other taxes" represented 3.2% of California county
revenues, while in 1985-86 they represented 3.0%. In fiscal year 1977-78, "fees" represented
10.5% of county revenues, while in 1985-86 "fees" represented 11.3%. Much of the change in
county revenue structure was due to the increasing importance of state aid, which rose from
23.8% of county revenues in fiscal year 1977-78 to 36.1% in fiscal year 1985-86. Id.
31. Id. at 79-80. In fiscal year 1977-78, "fees" accounted for 40.41% of revenue for en-
terprise special districts, while in 1985-86 "fees" represented 54.91%-a growth of over 33%.
In fiscal year 1977-78, "fees" accounted for 7.21% of revenue for non-enterprise special dis-
tricts, while in 1985-86 "fees" represented 23.92%-more than tripling in ten years. Id.
32. Id. at 23-24. The first special assessment districts were authorized in the 1909 Park
and Playground Act, with later authorizations for parking, shopping malls and lighting. See id.
at 23. Legislation after 1978 allowed the creation of special districts for fire suppression, vec.
tor (pest) control, and rapid transit improvements. See id. at 23-24. There are presently "m
extensive number of authorizations for creating districts and levying assessments for other im
July 19n PROPOSITON 218
courts specifically characterized such special assessment as "not a tax at
all" and thus exempted it from the provisions of Proposition 13 requiring
a supermajority The result was "an explosive growth in the use of
benefit assessment districts." 34  The number of bond issues more than
quintupled from 1982 to 1986.' 5 During the same time period, the
monetary value of those bonds rose from $67.3 million to $1,153.2 mil-
lion.
Overall, local governments raised thousands of existing taxes and
fees and implemented hundreds of new charges. 7 Local governments
tailored these new revenue sources to avoid the status of "special tax. 3
By changing their revenue structures, local governments circumvented
the electoral oversight provisions of Proposition 13 by increasing the
portion of their revenue not subject to supermajority voter approval.
One of the reasons for the rapid growth in taxes and fees was the re-
strictive application of Proposition 13 by the California courts in the
1980s.' 9 In City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell," for example,
the California Supreme Court attempted to define the boundaries of a
"special tax" which, under the provisions of Proposition 13, would re-
quire a two-thirds vote of the electorate. 4 The court used a strict con-
struction and construed the terms of Proposition 13 narrowly.42 That al-
lowed local governments to replace the general revenues lost to them by
Proposition 13's limitation on real property taxes with new taxes adopted
by a bare majority of voters, rather than by a two-thirds majority vote.43
Local governments seized upon the Farrell decision and substantially
raised the rate of taxes used for such assertedly general purposes. Cali-
provements." Marc N. Meinick, New Avenue for Special Assessment Financing, 25 URB.
LAW. 539, 542 (1993).
33. See Melnick, supra note 32, at 545. See also County of Fresno v. Malmstrom, 94
Cal. App. 3d 974, 983-84 (1979).
34. TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 24.
35. See id. at 25. The number of bond issues rose from 33 in 1982 to 190 in 1986. Id.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 16-17.
38. See Koyama, supra note 28, at 1334-35. See also Melnick, supra note 32, at 545-46.
39. See Koyama, supra note 28, at 1341 ("It has been the courts [that] have taken an ac-
tive role in moderating the harsh fiscal impact of Proposition 13"). See generally id. at 1350-
68 (describing California cases strictly applying the provisions of Proposition 13).
40. 32 Cal. 3d 47 (1982).
41. See id. at 53-57. See also discussion infra, notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
42. See id. at 57. The court defined the term "special taxes" to mean "taxes which are
levied for a specific purpose rather than, as in the present case, a levy placed in the general
fund to be utilized for general governmental purposes." Id. A dissent argued for a broader
interpretation based on legislative intent. Id. at 57-58 (Richardson, J., dissenting). See gener-
ally infra, Part II.
43. See Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d. at 57 (Richardson, J., dissenting). See generally infra, Part
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fornia utility users' tax rates soared 58% in the two years following the
decision." California business license tax collections rose 33 % during
the same time period.45 The Court essentially found a loophole in Propo-
sition 13 that allowed local governments to circumvent sections 3 and 4
of Article XIII A, provisions that require voter approval of special
taxes.' As Howard Jarvis, the co-author of Proposition 13, said, "In
1978, Proposition 13 returned the power to control tax increases to the
people, where it belongs. However, the State Supreme Court twisted the
language of Proposition 13... [and] took away your right to vote on
city and county tax increases."'4
Proposition 62, a statutory initiative48 passed by the voters of Cali-
fornia in 1986, attempted to close the loophole created by the Farrell de-
cision. Proposition 62 defined all taxes as either general taxes or special
taxes "imposed for specific purposes." 49  Proposition 62 allows local
governments and districts to impose a general tax if (1) it is submitted to
the electorate and (2) it is approved by a majority of the electorate.50 The
proponents of Proposition 62 argued that the initiative would simply re-
turn "rights the State Supreme Court took away from us, [that] we [Cali-
fornians] won with Proposition 13.'51
While Proposition 62 successfully closed the general tax loophole to
Proposition 13, yet another alternative existed to raise local government
revenues without triggering voter approval requirements-increasing as-
sessments, fees and other nontaxing levies. After Proposition 13, as-
sessments and fees represented an increasing proportion of revenue for
local governments. 2 These included zoning and subdivision fees, police
and fire department charges, plan and map fees, animal shelter fees, en-
gineering fees, street, sidewalk and curb repair fees, weed and lot clear-
ing charges, first aid and ambulance fees, library fines and fees, parks,
44. See Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d. at 57 (Richardson, J., dissenting). Utility users' tax collec-
tions rose approximately $365 million from fiscal year 1982-83 to fiscal year 1984-85.
45. See Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d. at 59. Business license tax collections rose from approxi-
mately $270 million in fiscal year 1982-83 to approximately $360 million in fiscal year 1984-
85.
46. See TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 4; see also CAL. CONST. art. XIII
A, §§ 3-4.
47. CAL. STATE VOTER PAMPHLET 42 (Nov. 1992).
48. Unlike Propositions 4, 13 and 218, which were all constitutional initiatives, Proposi-
tion 62 was a statutory initiative. The primary legal difference between the two types of initia-
tives is that a statutory initiative must conform to the Constitution, whereas a constitutional ini-
tiative amends the Constitution. SENATE REVENUE AND TAXATION COMMITTEE, PROPOSITION
62: ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND PROVISIONS 8 (1986).
49. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 53721 (West 1997).
50. See CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 53723 (West 1997).
51. CAL. STATE VOTER PAMPHLET 43 (Nov. 1992).
52. See TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 17-18.
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and recreation and golf fees, among others. 3 By 1982, a sampling of
nineteen large cities (population over 100,000) found that almost 75% of
fees were raised from pre-Proposition 13 levels. 4 Smaller cities (popu-
lation less than 100,000) raised almost two-thirds of their user charges. 5
Counties also raised the majority of their fees.56 In addition, hundreds of
new charges were implemented by counties to supplement government
revenues.57 Increases were not evenly spread, and charges between ju-
risdictions in many cases were out of proportion to one another. 58 The
growth in both the quantity and size of fees continued unabated into the
1990s.
59
Proponents of Proposition 218 viewed the growth of fees and as-
sessments as yet another attempt to circumvent voter supervision of gov-
ernment revenue growth. "After voters passed Proposition 13, politi-
cians created a loophole in the law that allows them to raise taxes without
voter approval by calling them 'assessments' and 'fees.'" ' Proposition
218, passed by the voters on November 5, 1996, amended Article XIII C
and added Article XIII D to the California Constitution. 61 The Proposi-
tion specifically mandates that all general taxes imposed, extended or in-
creased after January 1, 1995, be submitted to the electorate for approval
by a majority vote within two years of the passage of Proposition 218.'
In addition, all assessments not previously approved by voters, 63 not
pledged for bond repayment,' or not specifically exempted' must be ex-
amined for compliance with Proposition 218. 66 In order for an assess-
ment to comply, the local government must first determine that the prop-
erty subject to the assessment derives a special benefit from the project or
service financed by the assessment.67 Second, the amount of special
benefit each assessed parcel derives from the project must be determined
53. Seeid. at 20.
54. See id. at 16.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 18.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 19.
59. See generally Koyama, supra note 28, at 1359-63 (discussing government regulatory
and service fees).
60. CAL. STATE VOTER PAMPHLET 76 (Nov. 1996).
61. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, XIII D.
62. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 2(b)-(c)
63. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 5(b).
64. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 5(c).
65. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 5(a). This section specifically exempts "any assess-
ment imposed exclusively to finance the capital costs or maintenance and operation expenses for
sidewalks, streets, sewers, water, flood control, drainage systems or vector [mosquito] con-
trol." Id.
66. See Proposition 218 § 4; CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 5.
67. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 4(a).
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by an engineer.' Third, local governments may assess properties only
up to the reasonable cost of the proportional special benefit conferred on
that parcel.6 9 For any new assessments, local governments must mail in-
formation relating to the proposed assessment, along with a mail-in bal-
lot, to the owner of each parcel affected by the proposed assessment.70
Within 45 days after the mailing of notices, the local government entity
must hold a public hearing at which time the ballots, weighted in propor-
tion to the amount of the assessment each property owner would pay, are
tabulated.7' A majority of the weighted votes must approve any proposed
assessment before it may be imposed.' I
Section 6 of Proposition 218 [hereinafter "section 6"] also limits
governmental authority to impose "property-related fees and charges. "'
Section 6 mandates that local governments determine whether a fee is
"property-related."' If a fee is not property-related, no further action
may be undertaken under this provision. However, if a fee is property-
related, then the local government must ensure compliance with Proposi-
tion 218.' s No property-related fee or charge may be imposed to pay for
a general government service,76 for a service not used by or immediately
available to the property owner,' or for financing programs unrelated to78
the property-related service. A new property-related fee or charge must
be submitted for voter approval and passed by either by a majority of the
owners with property subject to the fee or charge, or by a two-thirds vote
of the electorate residing in the affected area.79 Property-related fees or
charges may then be imposed only to the extent of the proportionate cost
to provide the property-related service to the charged parcel.80 Section 6
thus expands the requirement of voter approval over a broad range of
government levies. This provision, reminiscent of similar voter approval
requirements mandated by Proposition 13, further restricts the ability of
local governments to raise revenue without popular support.
While the provisions of Proposition 218 relating to the validity of an
assessment or fee are quite detailed, section 6 suffers from several weak-
nesses in its drafting. One of the primary difficulties in interpreting sec-
68. See CAL. CONST. art. XII D, § 4(b).
69. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 4(a).
70. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 4(c)-(d).
71. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 4(e).
72. See id.
73. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6.
74. See generally ELIZABETH G. HILL, UNDERSTANDING PROPOSITION 218 28 (1996).
75. See CAL. CONsT. art. XIII D, § 6.
76. See CAL. CONST. art. XI D, § 6(b)(5).
77. See CAL. CONST. art. XII D, § 6(b)(4).
78. See CAL. CONST. art. XII D, § 6(b)(2).
79. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6(c).
80. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6(b)(3).
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tion 6 is the ambiguity of its terms, specifically the meaning of the phrase
"property-related fee or charge." This phrase was created by the drafters
of Proposition 218 specifically for that provision and has not been previ-
ously defined by the courts or legislature. The drafters themselves did
not clearly define the term within the provisions of Proposition 218 or
any supporting materials. As the legislative analyst stated, "Proposition
218 restricts property-related fees, defined as fees imposed 'as an inci-
dent of property ownership.' At this time, there is no consensus as to
which fees meet this definition."81 This is a major flaw, since the appli-
cation of the law is determined by such definition. The importance of
clearly defining this term "will be an important and sensitive issue for the
Legislature and the courts.
82
California courts have taken an active role in examining the terms of
California's tax initiatives. 83 This has been true because Proposition 13
did not include a provision for legislative amendment, and without a grant
of authority in the text of the law, the California State Legislature is pre-
vented by the California Constitution from substantially amending or re-
pealing the law.84 Also, the California Supreme Court established that
legislative and administrative interpretation of such initiatives is subject to
judicial review. 85 The remainder of this Note examines how the ambigu-
ous provisions of Proposition 218, specifically those relating to "prop-
erty-related fees and charges," may be interpreted using the analyses de-
veloped by the California Supreme Court in its examination of
Proposition 13. Part II contends that the court has applied two rules
when interpreting the state constitutional initiatives, one narrow and one
broad, both of which remain valid law. Part Im proposes an argument
for the application of a broader construction to the terms of Proposition
218. Finally, Part IV offers a definition of the currently undefined terms
of section 6 that seeks to fulfill the intent of the drafters of the provision.
H. Proposition 13 Jurisprudence
Proposition 13 spawned a great deal of litigation. By mid-1985
alone, Proposition 13 had been at the center of more than eighty-one
court cases, fifty-six new statutes and resolutions, twenty-one attorney
81. HILL, supra note 74, at 18.
82. Id. at 19.
83. See Koyama, supra note 28, at 1341.
84. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) ("The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum stat-
utes. It may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only
when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without
their approval").
85. Amador Valley Joint Unified Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208,
247 (1978).
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generals' opinions, eleven legislative counsels' opinions and eight
amendments at state-wide elections relating to the definition and imple-
mentation of the new law.86 This "exciting legal life" was the direct re-
sult of the "murky drafting of the initiative." 87
In Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of
Equalization, the California Supreme Court for the first time directly ad-
dressed the issue of ambiguity in the drafting of Proposition 13.88 Plain-
tiffs in that case sought declaratory judgment concerning the constitution-
ality of Proposition 13.89 As part of a broad attack on the initiative,
plaintiffs asserted that "several words and phrases in Article XIII
A... are ambiguous or uncertain" and suggested that "in its totality the
new article is so vague as to be incapable of a rational and uniform inter-
pretation and implementation."' Plaintiffs argued that the terms of the
new law had to be sufficiently clear "so as to provide adequate notice of
prohibited conduct." 9 While the Supreme Court acknowledged impreci-
sion and ambiguity in a number of the particulars of Article XIII A, it
concluded in Amador Valley that the amendment was not "so vague as to
be unenforceable" 92 and found Proposition 13 valid under the California
State and Federal Constitutions.'
In upholding the validity of Proposition 13, the Supreme Court es-
tablished rules for interpreting the ambiguous provisions of the initiative.
The Court stated that Article XIII A should be clarified "in accordance
with several .. generally accepted rules of construction used in inter-
preting similar enactments. " 94  The decision set forth the following
framework to give meaning to the terms of the law: First, constitutional
enactments must receive a "liberal, practical common-sense construction
which will meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the peo-
ple."95 The Court next provided that a constitutional amendment should
be construed in accordance with the natural and ordinary meaning of its
words-but allowed that even a literal interpretation of the enactment's
terms "may be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to fulfill the intent
of the framers."' The Court further stated that "apparent ambiguities
86. See TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 4.
87. Id.
88. See 22 Cal. 3d at 208.
89. See id. at 219.
90. Id. at 244.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 245.
93. Id. The United States Supreme Court also accepted the constitutionality of Proposition
13 in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (no violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
94. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 245.
95. Id. (citing Los Angeles Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 59 Cal. 2d 863,
869 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96. Id.
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frequently may be resolved by the contemporaneous construction of the
Legislature or of the administrative agencies charged with implementing
the new enactment." 97 Finally, the Court concluded that where "the en-
actment follows voter approval, the ballot summary and arguments and
analysis presented to the electorate in connection with a particular meas-
ure may be helpful in determining the probable meaning of uncertain lan-
guage.""8 The Supreme Court affirmed that the goal of statutory inter-
pretation was "to carry into practical effect the collective will of
a... majority of our citizens.'
In Los Angeles County Transportation Commission v. Richmond,"°°
the California Supreme Court attempted to give meaning to the terms of
section 4 of Article XIII A [hereinafter "section 4"]. In that case, the
Los Angeles County Transportation Commission ("LACTC") enacted a
sales tax that was approved by 54% of the voters of Los Angeles County
in 1980.101 The LACTC's own executive director, George Richmond,
refused to implement the tax because it had not received a two-thirds vote
that he claimed was required by section 4. " The LACTC brought action
to compel Richmond to implement the tax."03
The Court began its analysis by noting that "[n]owhere is [the] im-
precision [of Article XIII A] more evident than in the language of section
4.""' That imprecision extended to the definition of "special districts"
that were authorized by that section to levy "special taxes."105 In par-
ticular, the term "special district," while not a novel term, had been de-
fined in various ways in various contexts." 6 The Court thus had to con-
sider "which of [the] various definitions [was] appropriate in the context
of section 4. "17
In Richmond, a plurality of the Court narrowed Amador Valley's
rule of statutory interpretation."0 8 Because of the fundamentally undemo-
cratic nature of the two-thirds majority vote requirement that applied to
special taxes under Proposition 13, the Court considered it "appropriate
to consider the substance and effect of the extraordinary majority re-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 245-46.
99. Id. at 247.
100. 31 Cal. 3d 197 (1982) (plurality opinion).
101. See id. at 200.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 201.
105. See id. at 201-02.
106. See id. at 202.
107. Id.
108. 31 Cal. 3d at 203-05; for a discussion of Amador Valley, see supra text accompanying
notes 88-89.
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quirement. "I" In addition, the Court stated that the "subject of the two-
thirds limitation is also of consequence." 0 The Court was concerned
that a minority of voters in a local district would be able to constrain the
power of government to raise taxes that in no way threatened the funda-
mental individual rights of that minority."1 The tax at issue in Richmond
was a broad-based tax on consumers that had no relation to property
ownership, did not increase the indebtedness of LACTC, and could be
repealed by a majority vote.112 Thus, the Court held that, contrary to the
liberal, practical common sense construction espoused in Amador Valley,
the "language of section 4 must be strictly construed and ambiguities re-
solved in favor of permitting voters of cities, counties and 'special dis-
tricts' to enact 'special taxes' by a majority rather than a two-thirds
vote."" 3 The Court then looked at the language of section 4,114 the mate-
rial set forth in the voter's pamphlet, 15 and the interpretation of the state
legislature. 6 The Richmond plurality opinion found that the intention of
the voters to impose a two-thirds vote requirement on the tax imple-
mented by LACTC was not clear, and thus the majority voter approval
received was sufficient to uphold its validity. 17
Justice Richardson wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing for a more
flexible interpretation of the ambiguities of section 4 based on the liberal
construction rule set forth in Amador Valley."' The dissent focused on
the function of the tax in question, viewing it as a replacement for real
property tax revenues affected by other provisions of Proposition 13."9
Justice Richardson did not apply a precise meaning to the terms of section
4, but rather stated that any tax whose purpose was to defeat the object of
Proposition 13 must necessarily be subject to the limits of Proposition 13,
even if not explicitly included in the provisions of Proposition 13.1' Jus-
tice Richardson stressed that the terms of Proposition 13 must be read in
a "broad and comprehensive manner" if the law were to achieve its pur-
109. 31 Cal. 3d at 203-04.
110. Id. at204.
111. See id. at 204-05.
112. Id. at 205.
113. 31 Cal. 3d at 205 (emphasis added); see also id. at 210 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(stating that majority applied interpretive rule of strict construction of constitutional language).
114. See id. at 205.
115. See id. at 205-06.
116. See id. at 206-07.
117. See id. at 208. Justice Broussard and Chief Justice Bird concurred in the decision.
Justice Kaus filed a separate concurrence in which Justice Newman joined, focusing on the de-
scription and discussion of the provision in the election pamphlet. Id. at 208-09 (Kaus, J., con-
curring).
118. See id. at 210-11 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 212-13.
120. See id. at 215.
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pose of providing property owners with effective tax relief.12 1 Justice
Richardson's dissent thus gave support to a dynamic interpretation of the
terms of Proposition 13, one that would take into account not only the
intent of the initiative's framers, but also the intent of local governments
and agencies responding to the limits of the constitutional provisions.' "
Shortly after its decision in Richmond, the California Supreme Court
decided City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell."z The facts of this
case were similar to those of Richmond. On April 1, 1980, the City and
County of San Francisco increased a business tax on payrolls and gross
receipts, the monies of which were added to the general fund.' 24 In 1980,
55% of San Francisco voters approved an extension of the increase."z
The mayor of San Francisco later approved a supplemental appropriation
of funds of the tax from the general fund to improve the municipally-
owned Laguna Honda Hospital.'26 John C. Farrell, San Francisco's con-
troller, refused to certify the availability of the funds, asserting that the
tax was a "special tax" and as such required approval by a two-thirds
vote of the electorate. 127 The issue before the Court was whether the
extension of the increase was a "special tax" under section 4.22
The court found that "[t]here can be no doubt that the term 'special
taxes' is ambiguous in the sense that it has been interpreted to mean dif-
ferent things in different contexts." 29 In giving meaning to the term, the
court applied Richmond's strict construction test.130 The court gave only
passing attention to the intention of the drafters of Proposition 13. 31 In-
stead, the court looked at the language of the provision, 32 the material
121. See id. at 217.
122. Interestingly, the plurality opinion lends some support to a dynamic, intent-based rule
of interpretation of section 4. In dicta, the opinion stated that the court could "deal with" any
legislative avoidance of the goals of Proposition 13 "if and when the issue arises." See id. at
208. Implicitly, then, the plurality did not see the facts of Richmond as a case of legislative
avoidance, so that the court's new rule of strict interpretation arguably would not apply where
such facts were shown.
123. 32 Cal. 3d 47 (1982).
124. See id. at 51.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. The court in Farrell had failed to reach the issue of "special taxes" because
the issue was obviated by their finding that LACTC was not a "special district." 31 Cal. 3d at
201-202. In Farrell, the City and County of San Francisco came within the purview of section
4. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII A § 4 ("Cities, Counties and special districts... may impose
special taxes.").
128. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A § 4; Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 50-51.
129. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 53.
130. See id. at 52-3.
131. See id. at 54-5.
132. See id. at 54.
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presented to voters in the ballot pamphlet, '33 and finally to legislative in-
terpretation. 13 4  The court found neither the election materials nor the
legislative interpretation provided authoritative guidance to the meaning
of "special taxes." 135 The court thus based its interpretation on the
"common meaning of the term" and gave the term a strict definition that
included only taxes levied for a specific purpose.
13 6
In 1992, the California Supreme Court revisited the meaning of the
term "special taxes" in Rider v. County of San Diego.37 In that case, the
Court reviewed the validity of a tax "enacted for the apparent purpose of
avoiding the supermajority voter approval requirement imposed by
[Proposition 13] with respect to 'only special taxes' sought to be imposed
by 'cities, counties and special districts.' "138 The case involved a sales
tax of one-half of one percent levied by the San Diego County Regional
Justice Facility Financing Agency [the "Financing Agency"]. 39 The San
Diego County Board of Supervisors submitted a similar tax to the voters
of San Diego County in 1985 for the purpose of obtaining additional
funds for justice facilities, but it gathered only 51% of the votes and
failed because of the two-thirds requirement applied to such special taxes
under section 4.1' In 1988, the tax was restructured as a general tax,
levied by the Financing Agency, which itself had been created specifi-
cally for the purpose of financing the construction of justice facilities for
San Diego County.1 4' The measure garnered the support of a simple
majority of votes cast and passed as a general tax, albeit one with a spe-
cific purpose.142
In invalidating the tax, the trial court found that the taxation scheme
was a deliberate attempt to circumvent the supermajority approval re-
quirement of section 4. 43 The court of appeal agreed with this finding of
133. See id.
134. See id. at 55.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 57. Justice Richardson filed a dissent that reiterated his objection to the use of
the strict construction standard first voiced in his Richmond dissent. See id. at 57-8
(Richardson, J., dissenting) (calling the majority's decision a "hole... cut in that protective
fence which the people of California thought they had constructed around their collective purse
by the adoption of Article XIII A."). Justice Kaus also filed a dissent, in which he pointed to
the odd result of the majority's opinion that general taxes could be raised without limit, while
only the much less common "special purpose taxes" were subject to the section 4 supermajority
provision. Id. at 58-59 (Kaus, J., dissenting).
137. 1 Cal. 4th 1 (1991).
138. Id. at 5.
139. See id. at 5-6.
140. See id. at9.
141. Seeid. at5.
142. See id. at 5-6. The tax passed with 50.8% of the vote. See id. at 6.
143. See id. at 6.
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fact.144 Nevertheless, the appellate court felt bound by the Richmond de-
cision and ignored the Legislature's dubious intent as it overturned the
trial court. Instead, the court of appeal held that the Financing Agency
did not come within a literal interpretation of the term "special district"
and thus section 4 did not apply.
145
The California Supreme Court seized upon the facts of Rider as an
opportunity to address the issue of legislative avoidance of Proposition
13. The court revisited some of the same ground covered in the Rich-
mond and Farrell decisions, but referred approvingly to Justice
Richardson's dissents in those cases. 146  Noting the ample evidence that
the revenue scheme at issue in the instant case was created to purpose-
fully circumvent the voter approval provisions of Proposition 13, the
court refocused its attention on the "probable intent" of the framers of
Proposition 13.147 The court based its interpretation of section 4 on its
own understanding of what the framers and voters would have wanted
had they been able to foresee the response of local governments to the re-
strictions of that provision. 148  Because the dynamics of revenue raising
were not foreseeable and thus were not adequately addressed by the
drafters of section 4, the court based its decision on mere speculation as
to their intent. 149
Noting that Proposition 13 was intended to restrict the ability of lo-
cal governments to impose new taxes to replace property tax revenues
lost under the other provisions of that measure, the court held that the
term "'special district' would include any local taxing agency created to
raise funds for city or county purposes to replace revenues lost by reason
of the restrictions of Proposition 13." '5o The court failed to clearly define
the parameters of the term "special tax," but concluded again that it must
144. See id. ("the [Financing] Agency is nothing more than an empty shell through which
the Board of Supervisors of the County of San Diego can exercise its discretion.")
145. See id.
146. See id. at 11.
147. Id. at 10-11.
148. See id. at 11 ("In our view, the framers of Proposition 13, and the voters who adopted
it, would not have intended [legislative circumvention.]") (emphasis added).
149. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Mosk noted, "[Tihe majority attempts to justify [its] re-
sult on the ground of vague 'probable intent' of the framers and electorate that approved Propo-
sition 13. But the opinion omits mention of any evidence proffered by the parties to demon-
strate the voters' intent and relies, instead, on nothing more than a statement expressed in a
rejected dissenting opinion signed by a single justice in Richmond almost a decade ago." Id. at
28 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
150. Id. at 11. The court then went on to develop an "essential control" standard to deter-
mine whether or not a local taxing agency is included in the definition of "special district." Id.
at 11-12. The court held that it may be inferred that such intent exists when a plaintiff "has
proved the new tax agency is essentially controlled by one or more cities or counties that other-
wise would have had to comply with the supermajority provision of section 4." Id. at 11.
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include any tax created to defeat the purpose of Proposition 13.151 In-
stead of defining the term, the court defined the circumstances under
which a tax, valid under a strict reading of the law, would be invalid.
This was an explicit rejection of Farrell and Richmond'52 and established
a more liberal intent-based standard of interpretation that added changed
circumstances to the analysis.
In Santa Clara County. Local Transportation Authority v.
Guardino,153 the California Supreme Court affirmed the rule that political
dynamics and institutional change were relevant to an analysis under the
Rider rule. The facts of the case were similar to those of Rider . 54 The
issue in Guardino, however, was whether the provisions of Proposition
62 applied to a tax that was "virtually identical to [the tax at issue in]
Rider with respect to the narrowness of [its] purpose."5' In examining
Proposition 62 in the context of the tax reform initiative movement, the
court echoed Justice Holmes' sentiment that "a page of history is worth a
volume of logic." 15 6 The court noted: "Given the evident intent of the
drafters of Proposition 62 to close by legislation what they perceived
were court-made 'loopholes' in Proposition 13, it is unreasonable to be-
lieve they would have chosen to leave the Richmond 'loophole' open
... 157 The court therefore expanded the terms of Proposition 62 to
include levies that would defeat the purpose of Proposition 62.151
Neither the Rider or Guardino decisions indicated the extent to
which the Rider rule limited the Richmond and Farrell decisions. Critics
have differed. Some commentators saw Rider as a "departure" from
151. See id. at 15 (stating that the "statute at issue was undoubtedly drafted with section 4
and Farrell's holding firmly in mind.") (citation omitted). Justice George concurred in the
opinion, stating that the constitutional issues associated with Proposition 13 need not have been
addressed because the tax was invalid under California Government Code sections 53720-30,
added by Proposition 62. See id. at 16-25 (George, J., concurring). Justice Mosk dissented,
arguing that the majority ignored standard statutory interpretation principles and relied on a
definition of the drafters' probable intent that was not supported by the evidence. See id. at 27-
28 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard filed a separate dissent, agreeing with Justice Mosk
and stating that the majority's definition was overbroad. See id. at 35 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 14.
153. 11 Cal. 4th 220 (1995).
154. In June 1992, the Board of Supervisors of Santa Clara County, acting under the
authority of the Local Transportation Authority and Improvement Act, created the Santa Clara
Local Transportation Authority [the "SCLTA"]. In July 1992, the SCLTA adopted an ordi-
nance that imposed a county-wide sales tax of one-half of one percent for twenty years and em-
powered the SCLTA to issue bonds payable out of the revenue from this tax. In November
1992, the ordinance was proved by 54.1% of the voters. See id. at 227-28.
155. Id. at 232 (emphasis in original).
156. Id. at 235 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
157. Id.
158. Id. (noting that petitioner's reading of Proposition 62 would create an exception that
would swallow the rule).
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precedent. 59 Others went so far as to say that both Richmond and Farrell
were discarded by the new ruling,' 60 and that Rider heralded a return to
an application of Amador Valley's liberal construction principles to the
provisions of Proposition 13, beyond the facts of that case. Lower courts
have given the most limited interpretation, and continue to apply a strict
construction in cases interpreting the terms of Article XIII A, section 4.161
For example, in Neecke, the court stated that, "[Tihe language and logic
of Rider, as well as the subsequent cases construing it, support the con-
clusion that the Farrell definition of a special tax was limited, rather than
overruled, by Rider .... Farrell remains viable in cases... where a
tax is levied by a general purpose agency and the proceeds are deposited
into its general fund .... " Such a reading is consistent with the Rider
majority's assertion that the decision represented a "reasonable interpre-
tation of section 4, consistent with Farrell's guidelines." 63 A fair read-
ing of Rider, then, is that "it simply carved out an exception to the 'gen-
eral funds rule' set forth in Farrell."164
Thus, both the strict Richmond/Farrell rule and the more liberal
Rider rule still stand as good law today. Under the Richmond/Farrell
rule of construction, where a constitutional initiative imposes a superma-
jority vote requirement on local government levies, and where the intent
of the framers is ambiguous, courts must apply a strict construction to the
terms of the law.' 65 On the other hand, the Rider rule allows courts to
interpret the meaning of such laws with the framers' "probable intent" inmind. 166
I. Interpreting Proposition 218
On November 6, 1996, California voters further limited the revenue-
raising powers of local governments by passing the "Right to Vote on
159. Dean Thomas Triggs, California Supreme Court Survey: October 1991-December
1991, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1545, 1601-02 (1992) (viewing Rider as a "departure from Rich-
mond-).
160. Note, Rider v. County of San Diego: "Special Districts" and "Special Taxes" Under
Proposition 13, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 829, 844-45, 848 (1992).
161. See, e.g., Neecke v. City of Mill Valley, 39 Cal. App. 4th 946, 958 (1995) (invali-
dating a municipal services tax under a Farrell analysis); Brydon v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist.,
24 Cal. App. 4th 178, 190-191 (1995) (limiting Rider to cases of legislative circumvention);
Fisher v. County of Alameda, 20 Cal. App. 4th 120, 124 (1993) (applying Farrell to a real es-
tate transfer tax).
162. Neecke, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 959.
163. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 15 (citation omitted).
164. Neecke, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 956.
165. Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 56-57.
166. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 15.
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Taxes Act," also known as Proposition 218.167 The provision in part im-
posed election requirements on taxes, 168 assessments, 169 and "property-
related fees and charges.""o The new law is sure to further revolutionize
public financing in California, decreasing local revenues by about $100
million annually, according to one analyst."' Local governments must
also bear increased costs as a result of mandated property owner notifica-
tion and election requirements." Also, local governments must expect to
cover the costs of litigation that will arise as the new law is imple-
mented.173 The increase in costs at a time of decreased revenues may
cause a relative funding shift away from discretionary programs toward
those subject to state and federal spending mandates.174 However, the
full impact of Proposition 218 cannot be assessed until the terms of the
law are clarified, for though "the measure is quite detailed in many re-
spects, some important provisions are not completely clear." 7 5
The California courts have expended considerable time and re-
sources clarifying the ambiguous terms of Proposition 13.176 The analyses
used in the Richmond, Farrell and Rider cases are most likely applicable
to the interpretation of the ambiguous provisions of Proposition 218, par-
ticularly the meaning of the term "property-related fee or charge" found
in section 6. The California Supreme Court stated in Amador Valley that
similar rules of statutory construction may be used in the interpretation of
similar enactments,177 and the court has applied its analyses in Richmond,
Farrell and Rider to other tax reform initiatives, most notably Proposition
62.17 Although the specific terms and subject matter of the tax reform
initiatives differ, Propositions 13, 62 and 218 were written with the same
general purpose in mind-to provide effective property tax relief and tax-
payer protection."7 Furthermore, Proposition 218 was drafted with
167. CAL. STATE VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 60, at 108 (Text of Proposed Law).
168. Prop. 218, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 3.
169. Prop. 218, § 4; CAL. CONST. art. XI D, §§ 1-5.
170. Prop. 218, § 4; CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6.
171. HILL, supra note 74, at 10-11.
172. See id. at 10.
173. Officials Grapple With New Tax Levies, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1996, at BI (discuss-
ing lawsuit filed by L.A. City Council challenging Proposition 218).
174. See HILL, supra note 74, at 10.
175. See id. at 7.
176. See generally, supra Part II.
177. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 245. For a discussion of the similarity between Propo-
sition 13 and Proposition 218, see supra, Part I.
178. See, e.g., Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 232 & n.6 (noting the similarity of terms between
the Farrell majority opinion and Proposition 62); see also Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 15 (George, J.
concurring) (applying Rider rule to Proposition 62).
179. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1 ("Proposition 13 was intended to provide effective
tax relief and to require voter approval of tax increases.... This measure protects taxpay-
ers. . . ."); Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 235 ("The manifest purpose of Proposition 62 as a whole
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Proposition 13 case law in mind.18° In understanding Proposition 218,
then, it is appropriate to look at Proposition 13 and the court's construc-
tion of its terms in Richmond, Farrell and Rider. 8 '
The remainder of this Note attempts to interpret the ambiguous
terms of Proposition 218 in light of Proposition 13 jurisprudence. In
particular, the Note focuses on the meaning of the term "property-related
fee or charge" as found in section 6 of Proposition 218. This is a new
term that was added to the tax reform lexicon with the passage of Propo-
sition 218. Part III.A applies the more strict Richmond/Farrell rule of
interpretation to section 6. Part III.B looks at the provision through the
intent-based rule of Rider. In Part III.C, the Note explores reasons why
an application of the Rider rule is appropriate.
A. Applying the Richmond/Farrell Rule to Proposition 218
Under the Richmond/Farrell analysis, where the terms of a constitu-
tional initiative are unclear, and where such a provision imposes a su-
permajority requirement, the provision should be strictly construed. 82
The strict construction rule could arguably apply to section 6. Section 6
includes a provision that subjects property-related fees to a vote of either
"a majority vote of the property owners of the property subject to the fee
or charge or, at the option of the agency, by a two-thirds vote of the
electorate residing in the affected area."' 83 Many commentators argue
that section 6 is vague because the term "property-related fee or charge"
lacks a clear definition." 4 Indeed, by coining the term "property-related
fee or charge," the drafters of Proposition 218 arguably created a new
category of levies not previously addressed by legislation or case law. A
strict construction in line with the Richmond and Farrell decisions would
look for evidence of the term's meaning in the language of the provi-
sion,8" in the voter's pamphlet aids,186 and finally in the meaning attrib-
uted by the Legislature.
187
was to increase the control of the citizenry over local taxation."); Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 201
("The goal of Article XIII A is real property tax relief").
180. See HOWARD JARvIS TAXPAYERS AssOCIATION, RIGHT TO VOTE ON TAXES ACT
(ann.), 2 (1996) [hereinafter RIGHT TO VOTE ON TAXES ACT] (referring to Rider).
181. See Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 231 (stating that to understand Proposition 62, it is help-
ful to review Proposition 13 and the case law construing it).
182. Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205.
183. Prop. 218, § 4; CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 6(c).
184. See HILL, supra note 74, at 18-19. See also Michael Coleman, Living with Proposi-
tion 218 5-7 (1996) (discussing various definitions of the term "property-related fee" by practi-
tioners).
185. See Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205.
186. See id. at 205-06.
187. See id. at 206.
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This analysis begins with a look at the language of the provision.
Section 6 defines property-related fees or charges as "any levy other than
an ad valorem tax, a special tax, or an assessment, imposed by an agency
upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership"88
and specifically exempts particular classes of fees, such as development
impact fees" 9 and electrical or gas service fees.' 90 "Property ownership"
itself is deemed "to include tenancies of real property where tenants are
directly liable to pay the assessment, fee or charge in question."191 The
provision thus applies to both absolute1" and qualified ownership."9 The
initiative, however, provides no guidance as to what it means for a tax or
levy to be imposed as an "incident" of property ownership."9 Given the
myriad local government levies that are in some way connected to prop-
erty ownership, this omission renders the term "property-related fee or
charge" ambiguous. Would such a definition apply to service-related
fees that are connected in some manner with the use of property but are
defined by the level of service provided?"g Would it apply to regulatory
fees?1" Each of these types of charges or fees are associated with the
possession or use of property, but the connection is compound, resulting
from usage of service as well as ownership or usage of property. Where
ownership or use of property is but one of the factors determining impo-
sition of a levy, application of Proposition 218 turns on which of the
many common definitions of the term "incident" is chosen."9
The next step in the Richmond/Farrell analysis involves a considera-
tion of the voter's pamphlet." 8 The "Analysis by the Legislative Ana-
lyst" [hereinafter the "Analysis"], printed in the November 1996 voter's
pamphlet, further clarifies the meaning of the term "property-related fee
188. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, §§ 2(e) and 4 (emphasis added).
189. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § l(b).
190. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 3(b).
191. CAL. CONST. art XI D, § 2(g).
192. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 679.
193. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 680.
194. Although neither the initiative itself nor the California Civil Code provide clear guid-
ance as to the meaning of "incident," a common meaning of the term as used in Proposition 218
would be to "denote[s] anything which inseparably belongs to, or is connected with, or inherent
in, another thing." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (6th ed. 1990). A more liberal definition
includes "anything which is usually connected with another, or connected for some purposes,
though not inseparably." Id. Proposition 218 does give a further hint as to the full meaning of
the term, stating that "[rjeliance by an agency on any parcel map, including, but not limited to,
an assessor's parcel map, may be considered a significant factor in determining whether a fee or
charge is imposed as an incident of property ownership for purposes of this article." CAL.
CONST. art. XI D, § 6(b)(5).
195. Such fees would include water, sewage and garbage collection fees that vary by use.
196. For example, would rent control administrative fees be included?
197. See supra note 194.
198. See Richmond, 31 Cal. 3d at 205-06.
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or charge." 199 In its introduction to the proposition, the Analysis states
that the measure "would constrain local governments' ability to impose
fees, assessments, and taxes."' The Analysis states that local govern-
ments "charge fees to pay.., for services to property""' and concludes
that the proposed requirements for property-related fees "would require
local governments to reduce or eliminate some existing fees. Unless lo-
cal governments increased taxes to replace lost fee revenues, spending
for local public services likely would be decreased."'2°
The Analysis offers some support for the view that the provision
contemplates only service-related fees, such as water, sewer and refuse
collection charges. 3 Regulatory fees, imposed for the purpose of main-
taining administrative oversight of property use, probably would not
come within this definition since they are not specifically connected with
providing public services. One commentator, espousing a "service-
provision" definition, asserts that the criteria should be whether a fee is
imposed on all identified parcels, "whether or not a request for service is
made and regardless of the level or amount of service used."204 This
definition would specifically exclude fees that are contingent upon usage
of property-related services. A sewage hookup fee would thus be in-
cluded in the definition of "property-related fee" while monthly sewage
treatment charges that vary with volume of sewage would not.
B. Applying the Rider rule to Proposition 218
In Rider, the California Supreme Court based its interpretation of the
ambiguities of section 4 of Proposition 13 on the probable intent of the
drafters of the initiative. 25 The Rider court considered the history of
California tax reform initiatives and read the terms of section 4 in that
context. The court thus presumed that the drafters of Proposition 13
would have intended to include within the voter oversight provisions of
section 4 any levy intended by the levying agency to defeat tax reform,
the primary goal of that law. 2°6 Under the new intent-based rule, a court
may examine not only the fiscal characteristics of a tax but also the leg-
islative purpose underlying new levies. The analysis in Guardino was





204. League of California Cities, LIVING WITH PROPOSITION 218 7 (1996) (Janet R.
Morningstar commenting).
205. See discussion supra at notes 137-152 and accompanying text.
206. See id.
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consistent with Rider in that the court looked to the historical context of
Proposition 62 to give meaning to the terms of that law.'
In looking at the terms of Proposition 218, it is important to recog-
nize the context in which that initiative was drafted. As noted above,
Proposition 218 is the latest effort in a line of constitutional and statutory
initiatives aimed at providing effective property tax relief to the citizens
of California. Local governments have responded to the success of the
tax reform movement by shifting the portion of local revenues to both
taxing and nontaxing levies that avoid the supermajority requirements of
Proposition 13. Proposition 218 itself notes, "local governments have
subjected taxpayers to excessive tax, assessment, fee and charge in-
creases that... frustrate the purposes of voter approval of tax in-
creases. ' The measure thus seeks to "protect[] taxpayers by limiting
the methods by which local governments exact revenue from taxpayers
without their consent."' Understanding the long history of legislative
circumvention that afflicted earlier tax reform initiatives, it is most prob-
able that the drafters of Proposition 218 intended the initiative to provide
a comprehensive law that would inhibit the ability of local governments to
avoid taxpayer oversight.
The terms of Proposition 218 address the types of levies that local
governments have used in the past to frustrate the purpose of voter ap-
proval. Section 3 applies the intent-based Rider rule to local tax levies.
210
Section 4 of Proposition 218 addresses assessments, one form of non-
taxing revenue that experienced "explosive growth" in the aftermath of
Proposition 13.11 The new law imposes stricter requirements on the
levying of assessments,212 and significantly impairs the ability of local
governments to circumvent voter oversight by reliance on this type of
revenue source.
When viewed in the context of Proposition 13 and subsequent case
law and together with sections 3 and 4 of Proposition 218, the probable
intent of section 6 becomes more clear. The drafters of Proposition 218
were certainly aware that local governments would most likely respond to
the restrictions imposed by sections 3 and 4 by increasing their reliance
207. See Guardino, 11 Cal. 4th at 235-36.
208. Prop. 218, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. XIII C § 1.
209. Id.
210. RIGHT TO VOTE ON TAXES ACT, supra note 180, at 2 ("This reinforces language of
Rider v. San Diego dealing with special taxes: The key is the purpose of the funding, not the
name of the bank account.").
211. TEN YEAR RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 1, at 24.
212. Prop. 218, § 4; CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 4 (requiring engineer's reports to be con-
ducted by licensed engineers, mandating mailed notice of assessments and requiring passage of
assessments by a majority of votes weighted according to the proportional financial obligation
of the affected property).
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on nontaxing, non-assessment revenue sources not subject to the restric-
tions imposed by those provisions. In fact, it is precisely that sort of
legislative circumvention of previous tax initiatives that brought about
Proposition 218. It would thus make sense to read section 6 in its broad-
est terms, viewing the term "property-related fee or charge" as a residual
category that is defined more in terms of legislative intent rather than la-
bels that may be manipulated by local governments. Thus, section 6
should not be read as creating a new, discrete category of revenue
sources. Instead, section 6 should include any levy imposed on the prop-
erty owner, or the tenant of real property directly liable to pay such levy,
to raise funds to replace revenue lost by reason of the restrictions of
Proposition 13, Proposition 62 and Proposition 218. This may be called
the "legislative-intent definition."
At first glance, such a definition-may seem to be a significant expan-
sion of the scope of voter oversight. Indeed, the legislative-intent defini-
tion would broaden the categories of levies susceptible to a challenge un-
der Proposition 218, including all forms of levies that are imposed on the
owners of real property as broadly defined in Proposition 218.23 This
means that, in addition to the fees includable under the Richmond/Farrell
analysis discussed above, 2 4 usage-related fees and regulatory fees would
potentially come under the auspices of voter oversight.
In fact, such a legislative-intent definition would apply to only a
small portion of the fees presently levied by local governments. 215  To
successfully challenge a fee or charge, a taxpayer would have to show a
relationship between the imposition or increase of a particular levy and
the voter oversight provisions of the tax reform initiatives. As the court
in Rider noted, "marshalling such evidence of intentional circumvention
may be difficult." 21 6 In addition, relatively few of the fees imposed prior
to Proposition 218 would likely come within section 6 because limitations
on assessments imposed by section 4 of Proposition 218 had not gone
into effect when those fees were enacted.
213. Proposition 218 includes within the definition of "property ownership" tenancies of
real property where tenants are directly liable to pay the assessment, fee or charge in question.
CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 2(g).
214. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text (discussing a service-related definition
of property-related fees).
215. See LIVING WITH PROPOSrION, 218 supra note 204, at 6-8 (discussing the extent to
which fees would be included in an intent-based definition of property-related fees).
216. Rider, 1 Cal. 4th at 11-12. In order to overcome such difficulties, the Court ruled that
such intent may be inferred where a new taxing agency is "essentially controlled by one or
more cities or counties that otherwise would have had to comply with the supermajority provi-
sion of section 4 [of Proposition 13]." Id. at 11 (emphasis in original). The task of proving
legislative circumvention under Proposition 218 would be significantly eased with a similar rule
of inferred intent.
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The most important aspect of the legislative intent definition is that it
would effectively prevent the growth of new fees to replace tax revenues
lost under the provisions of Proposition 218. Defining a property-related
fee or charge in terms of the purpose behind the levy avoids the pitfalls
associated with a complicated and confusing taxonomic law in favor of a
catch-all provision that prevents legislatures from attempting to circum-
vent other voter-approval provisions with superficial changes in their fi-
nancing structures. An intent-based definition of section 6 is a "practical
common-sense construction" that would meet "changed conditions and
the growing needs of the people. "217
C. Application of the Rider rule is appropriate here
There are, then, at least two competing approaches to interpreting
the terms of section 6 of Proposition 218. Under the Richmond/Farrell
rule, because section 6 imposes a supermajority voter oversight require-
ment, the law should be strictly construed. Where terms are ambiguous,
they should be interpreted as narrowly as possible, consistent with the
evident purpose of the law. The Rider rule employs a more liberal analy-
sis and allows courts to infer the probable intent of a law's drafters. In
the context of California's tax reform initiatives, the California Supreme
Court has consistently found that the drafters and voters intended to
thwart legislative circumvention. The question remains as to which of
these rules should apply to section 6.
The terms of section 6 are more appropriately analyzed under the
Rider rule. Application of the Richmond/Farrell rule would be appropri-
ate if circumstances changed so as to make the definition of the drafters'
probable intent highly speculative, or if the intent of the framers of sec-
tion 6 was truly ambiguous. Here, however, several factors combine to
make the probable intent of the framers of section 6 relatively clear.
First, the terms of the proposition itself point towards a more liberal
construction. Clause 5 of the initiative states that "[t]he provisions of this
act shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes of limiting local
government revenue and enhancing taxpayer consent."2"8 This clause
was included by the drafters of the initiative "to ensure that, in the event
of any ambiguity, that the rights of the taxpayers will be paramount."219
In construing the words of Proposition 218 to discern its purpose, the
provisions of section 6 and clause 5 should be read together.'
217. Amador Valley, 22 Cal. 3d at 245.
218. Prop. 218, § 5; CAL. CONST. art. XI C § 1.
219. See RIGHT TO VOTE ON TAXES ACT, supra note 180, at 14.
220. See Farrell, 32 Cal. 3d at 47, 54 (noting that "every word [of a law] should be given
some significance, leaving no part useless or devoid of meaning.").
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Second, a consideration of some of the supporting materials drafted
by the framers of Proposition 218 manifest an intent that Rider be applied
to the initiative. The "annotated version" of Proposition 218, written be-
fore the election and published by the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Associa-
tion, specifically refers to the Rider decision several times 21 It states,
for example, that sections 1 and 2 of Proposition 218 "reinforce[] the
language of Rider v. San Diego." m Although there is no specific men-
tion of the Rider decision in the annotations to section 6, the framers of
Proposition 218 clearly had that decision in mind when they drafted the
initiative. Section 6 was meant to prevent "circumventing taxpayer pro-
tections by manipulating the label of the levy."'
Finally, the history of the provision itself, along with the probable
effect of a strict construction, are both factors that weigh in favor of ap-
plying the Rider rule here. When Proposition 218 is viewed in the con-
text of the ongoing process of increasing voter oversight of local gov-
ernment revenues, an application of Rider makes more sense. "After
voters passed Proposition 13, politicians created a loophole in the law
that allows them to raise taxes without voter approval by calling taxes
'assessments' and 'fees."'" 4 Proposition 218 was a response to this dy-
namic.' Whereas court decisions such as Richmond and Farrell had
previously elevated the form of levies over their substance, the framers of
Proposition 218 wanted to avoid taxonomic circumvention of voter over-
sight by the legislature. Such an effort can only be achieved under the
dynamic construction rule of Rider.
IV. Conclusion
This Note attempts to clarify the provisions of the latest of the Cali-
fornia constitutional initiatives extending voter oversight to an ever-
widening range of local government actions. Part I recounted the history
of such initiatives, from Proposition 13 to the recently passed Proposition
218, and argued that each of the successive laws were interrelated with
their predecessors. Part II examined the California Supreme Court's
analysis of the provisions of Proposition 13, noting that two standards co-
exist for the construction of supermajority provisions. Finally, Part I
attempted to apply the Proposition 13 case law to the ambiguous provi-
sions of Proposition 218, specifically section 6. The Note concluded that
221. See RIGHT TO VOTE ON TAXES ACT, supra note 180, at 2.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 11.
224. CAL. STATE VOTER'S PAMPHLET, supra note 47, at 76 (Argument in Favor of Propo-
sition 218).
225. See RIGHT TO VOTE ON TAXES ACT, supra note 213, at 11.
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the more liberal Rider rule is appropriate for giving meaning to the elu-
sive terms of that law.
The recent history of California's taxpayer revolution can be seen as
an attempt to put substance over form. In Rider, the California Supreme
Court recognized that a strict adherence to the artificial categorization of
government levies is an invitation to strategic behavior on the part of lo-
cal governments. The voters of California recognized this fact with the
passage of Proposition 218. Only by giving the terms of that law their
fullest possible meaning can the courts avoid endless re-interpretation as
legislatures superficially conform their actions to the latest court opinion.
The purpose of Proposition 13 and Proposition 218, to provide effective
tax relief, will never be realized without recognizing the dynamics and
accounting for changes in legislative behavior caused by the enactment of
such laws.

